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Black, White and Gray: A Reply to Alschuler
and Schulhofer
Tracey L. Mearest
and Dan M. Kahantt
The goal of our Article' was to expose the anachronistic pic-
ture of political reality that informed the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Chicago v Morales.2 Relying on civil rights era prece-
dents designed to counteract racist policies aimed at locking mi-
norities out of the community's civic life, the Morales Court's
analysis seems to treat Chicago's gang loitering ordinance as if it
were indistinguishable from those earlier policies. The truth, we
argue, is that the gang loitering law is representative of a new
generation of public order provisions that enjoy the enthusiastic
sponsorship of minority communities. As a result of fundamental
reforms in American voting law, these citizens now enjoy signifi-
cant political strength in the nation's inner cities. They're using
that strength to rectify centuries' long denials of effective law en-
forcement in their communities - the vestiges of which, in the
form of high crime rates, continue to stifle the social and eco-
nomic advancement of American Blacks and Latinos. In these
circumstances, we suggest that the most constructive role for
courts is no longer to enforce tight constraints on discretionary
street policing, but to insist that inner-city communities structure
law enforcement in a way that doesn't dissipate their own politi-
cal incentives to police their police. We believe that the Chicago
gang loitering law meets this standard.3
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
I t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
We are grateful to the Russell Baker, Russell J. Parsons and Jerome S. Weiss Fac-
ulty Research Funds at the University of Chicago for generous financial support and to
Darwin Roberts and Paul Patrow for superb research assistance.
I Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Think-
ing: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U Chi Legal F 197.
2 687 NE2d 53 (Ill 1997), cert granted 118 S Ct 1510 (1998).
3 Since we drafted our Article, the United States Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari in Morales. We have drafted and filed an amicus brief in that case on behalf of a
coalition of twenty civic, religious, and business groups from Chicago. See Brief amicus
curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in Support of Petitioner, Chicago v
Morales, 118 S Ct 1510 (1998) (No 97-1121). Stephen Schulhofer has drafted an amicus
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Alschuler and Schulhofer critique our account of the politics
behind the gang loitering law as well as our general argument
about the significance of minority political empowerment for
criminal procedure jurisprudence.4 We respect the questions they
raise and the doubts they pose, but we believe, nevertheless, that
their conclusions are wrong. We first take up their description of
the factual background of the gang loitering ordinance - the part
of their response that is easiest to rebut - and then address the
admittedly difficult points they raise about the relationship be-
tween the political process and constitutional rights.
I. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GANG LOITERING
ORDINANCE
Alschuler and Schulhofer tell a disturbing tale of the back-
ground of the ordinance. In this story, the law is made out to be
the brainchild of white Aldermen and community groups, who
constructed it to wall off their communities from the presence of
menacing minority gang members.5 Flexing their political mus-
cle, these groups passed the gang loitering ordinance in the City
Council over substantial African American opposition.6
But this just isn't right. To be sure, the gang loitering ordi-
nance was controversial among all groups in the City. The sim-
ple fact remains, however, that impetus for the law came from
crime-ridden, minority communities, whose leaders played a
critical role in drafting and implementing it. Alschuler and
Schulhofer's conjecture that "the Council probably wanted" the
ordinance to facilitate "hassling" of those "'who are undesirable in
brief in the case for opposing the constitutionality of Chicago's gang loitering ordinance.
See Brief amicus curiae in Support of Respondents, Chicago v Morales, 118 S Ct 1510
(1998) (No 97-1121).
4 Albert W. Alschuler and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Meares and Kahan, 1998 U Chi Legal F 215.
5 See, for example, Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 217 (stating
that the ordinance derived from efforts of "a community group based in a predominantly
white section of Chicago" that was concerned "by the increasing presence of gangs like the
'Spanish Cobras' in their neighborhoods," with the assistance of white council members
whose "wards... were respectively 78 percent and 85 percent white"); id at 218 ("In sum,
white Aldermen and their constituents took the lead in initiating the anti-loitering pro-
posal ... .'); id at 219 ("African American Aldermen opposed to the ordinance said it was
'"drafted to protect the downtown area and white community" at the expense of innocent
blacks'") (quoting Fran Spielman, Loitering Ban Passes: Aldermen Bitterly Split On Anti-
Gang Measure, Chi Sun-Times 1 (June 18, 1992) (quoting Alderman John Steele)).
6 Id at 218 ("the reaction in much of the black community was emphatically nega-
tive").
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the eyes of police and prosecutors" 7 is baseless.
To illustrate, we will address (a) the origins of the law, (b)
the positions of City Council Aldermen, and (c) the manner in
which the law was enforced.
A. Where the Gang Loitering Ordinance Came From
As numerous newspaper accounts demonstrate, leaders of
Chicago's minority communities played an instrumental role in
framing the gang loitering ordinance.8 William Beavers, an Afri-
can American Alderman who represents a predominantly African
American and high-crime neighborhood on Chicago's South side,
contributed to drafting the law.9 Aldermen Ed Smith, Arenda
Troutman, and Toni Preckwinkle - all of whom are African
American and represent heavily African American wards with
7 Id at 230-31
(Of course the Chicago anti-loitering ordinance was not meant to be, and
never would be, taken so literally .... The "law in action" then may be
what the City Council probably wanted it to be. In the anti-loitering or-
dinance, the Council effectively awarded the police a hassling license
with teeth. As the Illinois Supreme Court noted, the ordinance was
"drafted in an intentionally vague manner so that persons who are unde-
sirable in the eyes of police and prosecutors can be convicted even though
they are not chargeable with any particular offense.")
(quoting Chicago v Morales, 687 NE2d 53, 64 (Ill 1997) (footnote omitted)).
8 See, for example, Fran Spielman, Council panel to seek gang crackdown, Chi Sun-
Times 18 (Feb 26, 1992) (reporting Alderman Beavers's formation of special subcommittee
charged with reviewing recently proposed ordinances and drafting constitutionally ade-
quate gang crackdown law with input from residents of West, North and South sides);
Editorial, Anti-gang law isn't the answer, Chi Trib 16 (May 20, 1992) (noting that "[flor the
last year neighborhood groups have worked with Chicago aldermen to draft a legal battle
plan against the city's fearsome, intimidating street gangs"); Robert Davis, Loitering law
clears hurdle despite fears, Chi Trib 1 (May 19, 1992) (reporting that gang loitering legis-
lation is "sponsored by dozens of other Aldermen" in addition to Alderman Banks); Fran
Spielman, Daley endorses anti-gang law: Rodriguez wary, Chi Sun-Times 14 (May 20,
1992) ('It's basically a response from block organizations, churches and community
groups'" (quoting Mayor Daley)); John Kass, Old tactic sought in crime war, Chi Trib at 1
(May 15, 1992) (noting that gang loitering bill "is welcomed by many residents of crime-
ravaged neighborhoods" and identifying Alderman Ed Smith, an African American repre-
senting a crime-ridden West Side district, as a key supporter of it).
9 Personal interview with Alderman Beavers on August 18, 1998. [Editor's Note:
The University of Chicago Legal Forum does not verify personal interviews.] Indeed, a
critical stage of the drafting process was Beavers's formation of a special City Council
subcommittee charged with refining the language of dozens of previously submitted anti-
loitering bills that Beavers himself viewed as unconstitutional. See Fran Spielman, Coun-
cil panel to seek gang crackdown, Chi Sun-Times at 18 (cited in note 6). The subcommit-
tee, formed months before the Police Committee chaired by Beavers reported the gang
loitering law to the full Council, was also assigned to obtain input from West, North and
South side communities. Id.
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severe crime problems - were also centrally involved. 10 So were
Lemuel Austin, who represents an African American South side
district, and then-Alderman (and now United States Representa-
tive) Luis Gutierrez, who represented a crime-plagued Latino
neighborhood on the Northwest side."
Moreover, in the words of one Alderman, the drafting process
was a "community wide effort" in which the sponsoring Aldermen
worked closely with leaders of various civic organizations from
minority neighborhoods.12 Among these groups were South Aus-
tin Coalition, a traditional community organization located in a
west side African American community concerned with economic
development and crime control, and Reach Out and Touch Minis-
tries, which works with troubled youth in the Englewood neigh-
borhood. 13 Both of these organizations are well-known for their
efforts against inner-city crime.14
As Alschuler and Schulhofer note, the Northwest Neighbor-
hood Federation ("NNF") was also part of this process. 15 Contrary
to what they suggest, however, the NNF doesn't represent pre-
dominantly white neighborhoods, but is an amalgam of diverse
'o Telephone interview with Alderman William Banks on August 19, 1998. Alderman
Banks represents the 36th Ward. Alderman E. Smith represents the 28th Ward; Alder-
man Troutman represents the 20th Ward; Alderman Preckwinkle represents the 4th
Ward. See Figure 1 for racial and ethnic population of Chicago wards.
" Alderman Austin represents the 34th Ward; Representative Gutierrez represented
the 26th Ward. See Figure 1 for racial and ethnic population of Chicago wards.
12 Telephone interview with Alderman Banks (cited in note 10); see also Editorial,
Anti-gang law isn't the answer, Chi Trib at 16 (cited in note 8) ("For the last year neigh-
borhood groups have worked with Chicago aldermen to draft a legal battle plan against
the city's fearsome, intimidating street gangs."). Police researcher Wesley Skogan de-
scribes the vocal multi-racial coalition support for the City's innovative CAPS program in
his recent book. Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, Community Policing Chicago
Style 20-38 (Oxford 1997). This program developed around the same time as the gang
loitering ordinance and responded to some of the same political currents we identify.
'3 Telephone Interview with Alderman Banks (cited in note 10).
" For examples of Reverend Jeffrey Haynes of Reach Out and Touch Ministries, see
Lorraine Forte, Young workers can taste success in community job-training program, Chi
Sun-Times 7 (Dec 23, 1996); Graeme Zielinski, Call To Brown's Gets Dream Cookin'" Chi
Trib Metro 1 (Nov 5, 1996); John W. Fountain, CHA Violence Just City's Tip Of The Ice-
berg; Gang Rivalries, Drug Wars Spill Into Many Areas, Chi Trib 1 (Apr 14, 1994); John
W. Fountain and George Papajohn, Gang War Paralyzes South Side, Chi Trib 1 (Mar 30,
1994). For examples of the South Austin Coalitions work see Regina M. Roberts, South
Austin neighbors get action on demolition, Chi Sun-Times 15 (Aug 8, 1996); Maudlyne
Ihejirika, Coalition Says Housing Fines Can Help Halt Abandonment, Chi Sun-Times 16
(Apr 5, 1993); Charles Kouri, Uniting for change: How forming a community group can
improve your lot in life, Chi Trib Your Place 3 (Jan 24, 1992).
15 Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 217 (cited in note 4) ("Concerned
by the increasing presence of gangs like the 'Spanish Cobras' in their neighborhoods, the
Northwest Neighborhood Federation, a community group based in a predominantly white
section of Chicago, formed an Anti-Gang Task Force.").
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groups, many of which come from the predominantly Latino
communities in the City's Northwest. 6 Indeed, Representative
Gutierrez has appeared with NNF as amici curiae in defense of
the gang loitering ordinance.17
As for the Daley Administration's involvement, it is true that
the Daley Administration supported the gang loitering ordinance
and lobbied for it. However, the Mayor did not take a strong
public stance in favor of the law until after it was clear that the
law had significant support from leaders in the African American
and Latino neighborhoods that have the largest gang problems.18
"In sum," Alschuler and Schulhofer's claim that "white Aldermen
and their constituents took the lead in initiating the anti-
loitering proposal, with strong backing and drafting assistance
from the Daley administration"19 is "incorrect [and] seriously
misleading," as it fails to acknowledge the critical role played by
minority communities and minority leaders in the genesis of the
gang loitering ordinance.20
B. What the Aldermen Did
The 1992 City Council vote adopting the gang loitering ordi-
nance confirms that critical support came from igh-crime mi-
16 NNF's work boundaries are just shy of Alderman Banks's predominantly white
ward. NNF does the bulk of its work in the 26th, 31st, 32d, and 35th wards, all of which
are predominantly or majority Latino wards. Interview with Ricardo Contreras, Area 5
Services Coordinator, CAPS Implementation Project on August 26, 1998. See also Figure
1 for racial and ethnic population of Chicago wards.
I' Brief amicus curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation, US Representatives
Henry Hyde and Luis V. Gutierrez, Allied Educational Foundation, Northwest Neighbor-
hood Federation, and West Avalon Civic Group, Inc, in Support of Petitioner, Chicago v
Morales, 118 S Ct 1510 (June 19, 1998) (No 97-1211).
18 Telephone interview with Alderman Banks (cited in note 10); see also Fran Spiel-
man, Daley endorses anti-gang law: Rodriguez wary, Chi Sun-Times 14 (May 20, 1992)
(reporting Daley's public endorsement of law, after its approval by Police Committee,
based on its grounding in support of "'block organizations, churches and community
groups).
19 Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 218 (cited in note 4).
20 Id at 216. In fact, the gang loitering ordinance was not drafted by anyone from
scratch but was rather self-consciously patterned on a gang loitering provision enacted by
Los Angeles. See Robert Davis and William Recktenwald, Angry aldermen target gangs:
Daley backs City Council call for extra police powers, Chi Trib 1 (Oct 24, 1991). The City
legal department did play a role in adapting the provision to Chicago's situation, but that
is hardly a surprise given the keen interest of South and West side Aldermen, including
Beavers, in drafting an ordinance that would survive constitutional review. See Spielman,
Council panel to seek crackdown, Chi Sun-Times at 18 (cited in note 8) (noting Beavers's
dissatisfaction with wording of previously introduced versions of gang loitering law); Fran
Spielman, Council panel OKs loitering ban to fight gangs, Chi Sun-Times 1 (May 19, 1992)
(noting role of City attorneys in drafting law after "sift[ing] through dozens of anti-crime
proposals introduced in the last year by crime-weary aldermen").
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nority neighborhoods. Aldermen from the 4th, 7th, 8th, 28th,
34th, and 37th districts - all of which are predominantly African
American and all of which are located within the top ten police
precincts for violent crime - voted in favor of the gang loitering
ordinance. 21 Aldermen representing Latino neighborhoods that
overlap the City's top crime police districts - including the 1st,
10th, 12th, 26th, 31st, 32d, and 35th - also voted for the law.22
Together, these districts cover much of the high-crime neigh-
borhoods in the City. Had these Aldermen opposed the gang loi-
tering ordinance, it wouldn't have passed by an overwhelming
margin (as it did), but rather would have gone down to a 24-18
defeat in the Council.
To ground their claim that minority opinion toward the gang
loitering ordinance was "emphatically negative,"23 Alschuler and
Schulhofer note that "most of the African American Aldermen
who voted on the issue" - eight of fourteen - cast negative
votes. This form of accounting understates support for the gang
loitering ordinance among high-crime minority neighborhoods.
Alschuler and Schulhofer make no reference, for example, to the
votes of Aldermen representing high-crime Latino neighborhoods.
They make no attempt to connect the votes of African American
Aldermen to the crime rates in their districts. And they mention
only in a footnote the most recent City Council vote in May of
1998, in which a majority of voting African American Alderman
(and every voting Latino Aldermen) voted in favor of a resolution
of support of the gang loitering ordinance!24
The even more critical point, however, is that a simple head
count of African American Aldermen misconceives the issue at
hand. We argue that the premise of the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Morales was that the gang loitering law is indistin-
guishable from an older generation of loitering laws, the clear
aim and function of which were to reinforce the exclusion of mi-
21 See Figure 1 for racial and ethnic population of Chicago wards. Compare Figure 2
showing votes on the ordinance. See also Figure 4 indicating ten police districts with
highest murder rates and assault rates for 1993-95.
22 Id.
23 Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 218 (cited in note 4).
24 Alschuler and Schulhofer note that only thirteen out of nineteen African American
Aldermen were present at the Resolution vote. Id at 220 n 35. The six Aldermen who
were not present had previously voted on the measure in 1992. Two of the non-voters
were Aldermen Ed Smith and Toni Preckwinkle - key supporters of the gang loitering
ordinance. If we assume that these six aldermen would not have changed their votes,
then there would have been four more votes in favor of the gang loitering ordinance and
two votes against it bringing the total votes from African American Aldermen to twelve
against seven.
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norities from the nation's political and economic life. That inter-
pretation of political reality is impossible to sustain in light of the
key role that Aldermen from high-crime, minority neighborhoods
played in the enactment of the gang loitering ordinance.
It is true that some African American Aldermen opposed the
gang loitering law at the same time that African American Al-
dermen from surrounding minority neighborhoods voted for it.
That shows, unsurprisingly, that there were differences of opin-
ion among African Americans - as there were among Latinos
and whites - about whether the gang loitering law was a good
idea. But the very fact that such disagreement occurred within
and across ethnic and racial communities and not simply between
them - the very fact that the gang loitering law put into play
issues of policy and judgment that were vexingly gray, and not
starkly black and white - proves that the gang loitering ordi-
nance cannot be depicted as a weapon of a " 'white community'"
bent on dominating and oppressing "innocent blacks"2 - hyper-
bolic rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.26
Of course, the fact that some high-crime, minority neighbor-
hoods favored the gang loitering ordinance doesn't show that the
law embodies a fair balance of liberty and order for all minorities.
We don't take such a position. Rather, our claim is that courts
should defer to the balance struck by a community's political pro-
cess when the burdens of a democratically approved law are be-
ing meaningfully felt by the average member of the community
and not externalized to a disempowered or despised minority. To
show why we believe the gang loitering ordinance passes this
standard, we consider not only the origins of its political support,
but also the practical constraints on its enforcement, a matter to
which we now return.
C. How the Gang Loitering Ordinance Was Enforced
Alschuler and Schulhofer's speculation that the gang loitering
ordinance was "in action" what "the Council probably wanted" it
to be27 - namely, a "license" to "hassl[e]" those "'who are unde-
25 Spielman, Loitering Ban Passes, Chi Sun-Times 1 (cited in note 5) (quoting Alder-
man John Steele).
26 See, for example, id; Chicago v Youkhana, 660 NE2d 34, 38 (Ill App 1995) (de-
scribing ordinance enforcement as a "police-state" tactic); Robyn Blumner, When the Law
is Based on Looks, Rocky Mountain News 5B (May 10, 1998) (comparing enforcement of
Chicago's law to the law enforced decades ago in Jacksonville, Florida, and claiming that
its enforcement was more reminiscent of Iraq than America).
27 Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 230 (cited in note 4).
51
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sirable in the eyes of police and prosecutors,'" 28 - is also flatly
inconsistent with the manner in which the gang loitering ordi-
nance was implemented. Mechanisms of political oversight that
attended enforcement of the gang loitering ordinance were
drafted to assure that it wouldn't be used to exclude minority
youth from commercial areas or white residential neighborhoods,
and that the law would be applied within minority, high-crime
neighborhoods only in a manner consistent with the desires of
those neighborhoods' residents.
Consistent with the expectations of the Aldermen who voted
for the gang loitering ordinance, the Police Department delayed
enforcement until it had promulgated specific enforcement regu-
lations.2 These regulations defined key terms with greater preci-
sion, and specified which officers in the Department could enforce
the gang loitering ordinance.30 But even more important, the
regulations provided that the gang loitering ordinance could be
enforced only in those neighborhoods "frequented by members of
criminal street gangs."31
Actual enforcement of the gang loitering ordinance was con-
sistent with this design. Records compiled by the Police Depart-
ment confirm that enforcement was overwhelmingly concentrated
on the City's high-crime neighborhoods - the very ones whose
representatives and leaders were instrumental to passage of the
law in the first place.32 Consequently, there was neither any
prospect nor any subsequent evidence of the gang loitering ordi-
nance being used to reinforce exclusion of African American
28 Id at 230-31 (quoting Chicago v Morales, 687 NE2d 53, 64 (Ill 1997).
29 When the City Council approved the gang loitering ordinance, it was understood
that the police department would issue regulations specifically geared to prevent harass-
ment of minorities. See Robert Davis, Loitering law clears hurdle despite fears, Chi Trib 1
(May 19, 1992) (reporting testimony of deputy corporation counsel that implementing
regulations would assure that proposed law would "be used surgically and not like a blun-
derbuss"); Fran Spielman, Daley endorses anti-gang law: Rodriguez wary, Chi Sun-Times
14 (May 20, 1992) (reporting support of Matt Rodriguez, then-acting Police Superinten-
dent, subject to adoption of implementing regulations aimed at assuring public that police
are not engaged in harassing minorities).
30 Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4, §§ III-V (1992). Alschuler and
Schulhofer maintain that the regulations do nothing to narrow the concept of "loitering."
See Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 227 n 73 (cited in note 4). In fact,
the regulations provide that the ordinance is aimed at "[tjhe presence of criminal street
gang members in certain public and private places [that] creates fear for the safety of
persons and property .... " Id at § II.
31 Chicago Police Department, General Order No 92-4 at § VI(A).
32 Compare Figure 2 showing votes on the ordinance with Figure 4 showing areas of
enforcement and the ten police districts with the highest murder rates and assault rates
for 1993-95.
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youth from commercial neighborhoods - an anxiety noted by Al-
schuler and Schulhofer.
33
Enforcement within gang-infested neighborhoods was also
subject to meaningful political oversight. Under the regulations,
the Police Department was obliged to consult with community
residents and leaders. In addition, Mayor Daley suggested that
enforcement of the gang loitering ordinance within any given
ward could be contingent on the assent of that ward's Alderman. 34
There is no evidence that any Aldermen - including those who
opposed the gang loitering ordinance in the initial Council vote -
attempted to exercise this opt-out, indicating that the gang loi-
tering ordinance was indeed enforced in a manner consistent with
the preferences of neighborhood residents.
Thus, there can be no serious contention that the gang loi-
tering ordinance lacked deep-seated community support in the
City's high-crime, minority neighborhoods. Otherwise, it
wouldn't have been enacted in the first place and wouldn't have
been enforced. The only important question is whether courts
should regard this support as probative evidence that the law
reasonably balances order and liberty for constitutional purposes.
What Alschuler and Schulhofer have to say about this is, in our
view, the most interesting part of their response.
II. BURDEN SHARING AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Alschuler and Schulhofer bombard our alternative constitu-
tional principles with a host of challenges. Some of the points
they make are formal and doctrinal: the idea of community bur-
den sharing, they argue, is alien to the conception of individual
rights embodied in the Constitution.35 Other points are concep-
tual: "groups do not come predetermined," they note, so how can
courts be expected to identify the relevant community for pur-
poses of applying our community burden sharing test?36 Still
other of their points are factual or interpretive in nature: they
33 See Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 230-31 (cited in note 4)
(quoting Chicago v Morales, 687 NE2d 53, 64 (111 1997).
34 See Robert Davis, Special units to police loiterers: City wants to make new anti-
gang law hold up in court, Chi Trib 3 (June 19, 1992) ("Mayor Richard Daley sarcastically
suggested Thursday that the Police Department might not enforce the new law in the
wards of those aldermen who voted against it, telling ward residents that their elected
representatives did not want increased police protection.").
35 See Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 240, 243-44 (cited in note 4).
36 Id at 240.
253
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maintain, for example, that continued instances of police brutal-
ity demonstrate the folly of relaxing judicial oversight of discre-
tionary policing.37 And finally, some of their points are purely
polemical: because "majority support for many of the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights seems ephemeral, [ ]the Meares-Kahan con-
ception of rights could make many familiar freedoms disappear."38
We will do our best in the limited space we have here to ad-
dress these arguments. For additional responses, we refer read-
ers to our piece in the Georgetown Law Journal.39
A. Burden Sharing and Individual Rights
Start with the assertion that "Our Constitution does not per-
mit a majority to limit individual rights simply by offering to
share the burden."40 This is true, but off point. The question is
whether the willingness of majorities to share in burdens is rele-
vant to determining whether a law limits individual rights. The
familiar political process theory of judicial review confirms that
the answer is yes.
It is commonplace to describe constitutional rights - par-
ticularly those that relate to criminal justice - as guaranteeing a
reasonable "balance between liberty and order."41 The political
process theory, as articulated in the famous "Carolene Products
footnote"42 and developed primarily by John Hart Ely,43 deter-
mines how courts should assess whether the balance struck by
any particular policy is reasonable. If the coercive incidence of a
particular policy is being visited on a powerless minority, the the-
ory requires courts to make an independent assessment of
whether the order benefits outweigh the liberty costs. This ex-
plains why courts strictly scrutinize policies that discriminate on
the basis of race, restrict "dangerous" speech, or impose special
obligations on account of religion.44
But when a community can be seen as internalizing the coer-
cive incidence of a particular policy, courts are much less likely to
37 Id at 223-24, 238-39.
38 Id at 240.
39 See Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 Georgetown L J 1153 (1998).
40 Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 240 (cited in note 4).
41 See, for example, Medina v California, 505 US 437, 443 (1992).
42 See United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938).
43 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard 1980).
44 See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 Va
L Rev 747, 754-55, 760-61 (1991).
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second-guess political institutions on whether the tradeoff be-
tween liberty and order is worthwhile. This explains the defer-
ence courts afford to generally applicable laws under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause,45 the dormant Commerce Clause,46
and even the Free Exercise Clause.47 When courts defer to the
political process in those contexts, they aren't saying that the
majority gets to decide what rights minorities have, but rather
that the willingness of the majority to bear a particular burden
suggests that the policy in question doesn't embody the political
undervaluation of liberty that constitutional rights are meant to
prevent.
This theory explains much of established criminal procedure
doctrine.4 Normally, the police must obtain a warrant, supported
by probable cause, before they can conduct a search. This re-
quirement recognizes that law enforcement officials cannot be
trusted to attach sufficient value to the liberty of individual
criminal suspects, whose interests are generally a matter of indif-
ference to the general public.49 Law enforcement officials needn't
obtain a warrant or even have probable cause, however, to stop
motorists at sobriety checkpoints5 or to search all individuals
entering airports or government buildings.51 This, too, is best
explained under a political process theory: insofar as these poli-
cies do burden average members of the community, there is much
less reason for courts to doubt the determination of politically
accountable officials that these policies strike a fair balance be-
tween liberty and order.52
If the burden of a law enforcement policy falls on someone
other than the average citizen, the Court's cases can be read as
requiring deference in cases where the political process can be
seen as sufficiently attentive to the regulated party's interests.
45 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 83 (cited in note 43).
46 See South Carolina State Highway Department v Barnwell Brothers Inc, 303 US
177, 184 n 2 (1938).
47 See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith, 494
US 872 (1990).
48 See Kahan and Meares, 86 Georgetown L J at 1171-76 (cited in note 39).
49 See, for example, Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 449-50 (1971).
50 See Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 (1980) (upholding
sobriety checkpoints where uniformly administered to all passing motorists); with Dela-
ware v Prouse, 440 US 648, 659-60 (1978) (invalidating random vehicle stops because they
involved "standardless and unconstrained discretion").
51 See generally National Treasury Employees Union v Von Raab, 489 US 656, 675 n 3
(1989).
52 See Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment As
Constitutional Theory, 77 Georgetown L J 19, 95-96 (1988).
55
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Thus, random drug-testing of student athletes53 is best seen as
exempted from the warrant requirement not because student
athletes exercise significant influence in the political process, but
because their parents, who naturally take their children's inter-
ests to heart, do. Likewise, searches of regulated commercial en-
terprises, which exercise considerable influence in the political
process, and which pass the cost of regulation on to consumers,
are sometimes exempt from the warrant requirement under the
"administrative search" doctrine.54
Our emphasis on burden sharing was designed to show that
the Due Process constraints on discretionary policing can and
should be assimilated to this framework. Papachristou and Shut-
tlesworth - the primary precedents relied on by the Illinois Su-
preme Court - reflect the exacting degree of statutory precision
that courts do and should demand when the burdens of commu-
nity policing are being concentrated on politically disadvantaged
minorities. But in a setting in which a public order provision is
supported by those same groups, in large part because they see it
as an appropriately moderate form of law enforcement for their
children and their neighbors' children, courts ought to show con-
siderably more deference to the political process. 55
B. Racist Police
Contrary to what Alschuler and Schulhofer imply, one does
not have to believe that racially motivated police brutality "has
vanished" to conclude that courts should now be more willing to
trust inner-city communities to police their own police than they
were during the era in which Papachristou and Shuttlesworth
were decided. 6  Indeed, only someone who "does not read the
53 See Vernonia School Dist v Acton, 515 US 646 (1995).
54 See, for example, New York v Burger, 482 US 691 (1987) (upholding warrantless
searches of automobile salvaging businesses); Donovan v Dewey, 452 US 594 (1981). See
generally Wasserstrom and Seidman, 77 Georgetown L J at 96; William J. Stuntz, Pri-
vacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich L Rev 1016, 1044-45 (1995).
5 For an analysis of Fourth Amendment law which makes analogous arguments with
regards to practical community needs, see Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretak-
ing, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U Chi Legal F 261.
56 Alschuler and Schulhofer, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 238 (cited in note 4):
Part II of this article showed that the argument Meares and Kahan offer
for abandoning the 1972 (and the 1939 and the 1926) conception of rights
rests on a nonsequitur. Whether African Americans have made more
than symbolic progress in the political arena since 1972 is debatable. But
even if the gains of recent decades are properly characterized as substan-
tial, these gains have left African Americans far short of parity. Anyone
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newspapers"67 could form a belief that foolish. At the same time,
only someone who reads the papers with astonishing selectivity
could believe that the problem of police racism today is indistin-
guishable from what it was thirty years ago. In 1968, Frank
Rizzo emerged as a national political figure because of his orches-
tration of racial terrorism as Police Commissioner (and later
Mayor) of Philadelphia.58 In 1998, ambitious urban mayors like
Rudolph Giuliani make a public point of energetically disciplining
racists cops;59 urban police chiefs such as Daryl Gates, who over-
see racist forces, find themselves unceremoniously forced out of
their jobs and relegated to the cultural and political fringe.6°
This welcome change is a consequence of the same political
dynamics that account for inner-city minorities' growing support
for effective community policing. Along with more effective law
enforcement, African American political leaders have demanded
and obtained more effective bureaucratic procedures for punish-
ing police brutality.61
These procedures do not completely eliminate the risk of har-
assment associated with the new community policing. But the
willingness of inner-city residents to support this form of law en-
forcement nevertheless reflects their judgment that in today's
political and social context, the continued victimization of minori-
ties at the hands of criminals poses a much more significant
threat to the well-being of minorities than does the risk of arbi-
trary mistreatment at the hands of the police.62
who contends that the "institutionalized racism" of American police de-
partments has vanished does not read the newspapers.
57 Id.
58 See S. A. Paolantonio, Frank Rizzo: The Last Big Man in Big City America 97-98,
142-54 (1993) (describing wooing of Rizzo by Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972 presidential
campaigns); Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72, 125
(Straight Arrow 1973) (describing "super-cop Mayor" Rizzo as part of the "gang of senile
leeches" in the Democratic party who offered only "a bogus alternative to the politics of
Nixon").
69 See Dennis Cauchon, Giuliani holding cops accountable in sex assault, USA Today
3A (Aug 15, 1997) (noting quick and forceful [election-year] response of Giuliani to racially
motivated police assault).
60 See Claudia Puig, Daryl Gates On Show's End. "I Have Real Mixed Emotions", LA
Times F2 (Dec 30, 1993) (reporting Gates's short tenure as reactionary radio talk show
host).
61 See Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race: Quiet Revolution in the South, 108
Harv L Rev 1359, 1377 (1995) (Book Review).
62 As Randall Kennedy has written:
[T]he principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to crimi-
nal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the laws.
Whereas mistreatment of suspects, defendants, and criminals has often
57
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C. Which Community?
As Alschuler and Schulhofer recognize, whether the political
process or community burden sharing approach generates plausi-
ble results depends on how the community is specified. A court
wouldn't accept the claim, for example, that a community has
internalized the burden associated with a ban on subversive
speech merely because all members of the community were sub-
ject to it. The average voter clearly doesn't value such speech and
likely despises citizens who do.63
What this shows is that the burden-internalization test ulti-
mately turns on normative criteria rather than factual ones. A
court can conclude that a law or policing technique passes the
political process test, then, only if the average citizen is affected
by that law or policy in a way that entitles her judgment to moral
respect. That doesn't mean that a court has to conclude that the
average citizen is right on the merits before it defers. But it does
mean that it has to be convinced, based on a complete under-
standing of her capacities and her situation, that the average
voter is the one entitled to balance the relevant interests and
values.
As we argued in our Article, we think the residents of Chi-
cago's high-crime, minority neighborhoods - the ones in which
been used as an instrument of racial oppression, more burdensome now in
the day-to-day lives of African-Americans are private, violent criminals
(typically black) who attack those most vulnerable without regard to ra-
cial identity. Like many activities in America, crime tends to be racially
segmented; fourth-fifths of violent crimes are committed by persons of the
same races as their victims. Hence, behind high rates of blacks perpe-
trating violent crimes are high rates of black victimization. Black teen-
agers are nine times more likely to be murdered than their white coun-
terparts. While young black men were murdered at the rate of about 45
per 100,000 in 1960, by 1990 the rate was 140 per 100,000. By contrast,
in 1990 for young white men the rate was 20 murder victims per
100,0000. One out of every twenty-one black men can expect to be mur-
dbred, a death rate double that of American servicemen in World War II.
Such figures place the now-mythic beating of Rodney Kind in a somewhat
different light than it is typically put .... In terms of misery inflicted by
direct criminal violence, blacks (and other people of color) suffer more
from the criminal acts of [other blacks] than they do from the racist mis-
conduct of white police officers."
Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 19-20 (Pantheon 1997) (footnotes omitted).
63 Compare Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v Hialeah, 508 US 520, 545-46
(1993) (invalidating facially general bar on animal sacrifice on ground that burden is felt
only by worshipers of particular sect and thus 'ha[s] every appearance of a prohibition
that society is prepared to impose upon [members of the sect] but not upon itself.' This
precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent."),
quoting Florida Star v B.J.F., 491 US 524, 542 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
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support for the gang loitering ordinance originated and in which
it was enforced - are the citizens entitled to determine whether
the gang loitering law reasonably balances liberty and order.
They are the ones who daily face a heightened risk of criminal
victimization from gang criminality, and who experience first-
hand the destructive impact of gangs on the economic and social
lives of their communities. In addition, they are the mothers and
fathers, the sisters and brothers, and the neighbors of the youths
subject to the law. They are thus vitally concerned not only with
reducing crime, but with avoiding the devastating consequences
that conventional law enforcement, particularly long terms of
imprisonment, can inflict on offenders and their communities.
They support the gang loitering ordinance because they see it as
a form of policing that effectively secures order without destroy-
ing the lives of community youth who find themselves enmeshed
in the complex economic and social forces that fuel gang crimi-
nality.
It is important to note, moreover, that anyone who would
dispute the moral qualifications of inner-city residents to judge is
obliged to defend the superior qualifications of those who they
would have do the judging instead. There is no perspective-free
way to figure out what rights people have. Rights are designed to
assure a reasonable balance between liberty and order. But
someone has to exercise moral judgment and decide whether the
balance struck by any particular policy is reasonable. When
commentators like Alschuler and Schulhofer argue that the me-
dian inner-city voter is incompetent to make that decision, they
are necessarily saying that judges who are not inner-city
stakeholders are in the best position to assess what is best.64 Yet
they never explain why that is so.
The tough issues surrounding the new community policing
obviously aren't a game for the average inner-city voter. A mor-
ally responsible criminal procedure doctrine would recognize that
her judgment on these matters is entitled to profound respect
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